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
Political and economic integration within the framework of the European
Union was designed to lower trade barriers, raise the efficiency of economic
exchanges, and promote economic and political development and peace.
However, as the financial resources and complexity of EU programs has
grown, there is increasing evidence that a significant percentage of the EU’s
budget has been the victim of corruption. The basic purpose of this paper is to
discuss the state of a research project, which was intended to determine
whether international organizations such as the EU are just as likely to promote
such fraud and corruption as (unintended) side effects of economic and
political integration. Those side effects then lower the organizations’ economic
efficiencies, raise barriers to trade, and eventually discredit further attempts at
multinational cooperation. The broader purpose of the project is to understand
how the politics of rent-seeking and interest representation changes as it is
reconstituted at the level of an international organization. Do the citizens and
governments of the member states bring national patterns of corruption to a
supranational regime such as the EU when they become involved, or does the
ultimate source of the corruption inhere in the nature of international
organizations and their institutional frameworks? Do states see fraud and
corruption in an international organization as a marginal cost to be discounted
by extensive benefits derived from the organization? Or do they see it as,
perversely, one of the extensive benefits of an international organization,
which serves as a side-payment to various key constituencies, or as a direct
benefit to the policy-maker? This paper reviews the EU’s structure, and its
enforcement and oversight mechanisms in the CAP and in certain other areas,
and suggests that, at best, the member states have manifested benign neglect
towards fraud, corruption and regulatory enforcement.
 This research is supported by a U.S. National Science Foundation Grant (SES 0074977), a
Jean Monnet Fellowship from the European University Institute, and a National Fellowship
from the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. Its findings do not necessarily reflect the
views or opinions of the NSF, the EUI or the Hoover Institution.CREATING A COMMON MARKET FOR FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN INSTITUTIONAL ACCIDENT, OR A
DELIBERATE STRATEGY?
This paper outlines a project, which will attempt to determine whether citizens
and governments continue to employ long-standing national patterns of
corruption when they become involved in a supranational regime such as the
EU, or whether the source inheres in the nature of international organizations.
Is corruption and fraud, in other words, the result of national patterns being
brought into the international arena, or a negative externality inherent in any
international organization? At this point, the paper (and its author) is most
focused on whether available evidence can discriminate between hypotheses;
that is to say, how do we answer these questions? The first part of the paper
raises the general questions and discusses possible definitions of fraud and
corruption. The second part presents the research hypotheses and methodology.
The third part discusses the hypotheses in light of preliminary evidence.
International politico-economic organizations such as the EU are
expected to lower barriers to trade, raise the efficiency of economic exchanges,
as well as promote economic and political development and cooperation. This
paper takes as its starting point the possibility that international organizations
are just as likely to promote, as side-effects, fraud and corruption, in the
process lowering the organizations’ economic efficiencies, raising barriers to
trade, and discrediting further cooperation. Recent instances of possible
corruption in the EU’s main administrative body (the Commission), the
discovery of the fraudulent use or misappropriation of IMF and World Bank
funds, as well as some other recent high profile instances of financial
diversions in international bodies all serve to highlight the vulnerability of
international organizations to corrupt practices. Corruption seriously
undermines economic growth and socio-political equality and legitimacy
(Mauro 1995; Della Porta and Vannucci 1997; Johnston 1986; Rose-Ackerman
1996). In order to analyze this growing problem, this project will focus on
fraud and corruption in the European Union.
PART I
First, fraud and corruption in the EU raise challenging questions for several of
the dominant social science approaches to explaining political and economic
behavior. Of the three approaches discussed below, agency theory is ill-
equipped to deal with a situation in which the agent is also the principal; the
international institutionalist perspective shies away from the likelihood that
state interests may lie in deliberately tolerating fraud in certain economic3
sectors; and cultural arguments are undermined by the possibility that
behaviors which were thought to be culture (state)-specific may be
universalized through a new institutional context, or may be typical of all
governments.
Second, of all international organizations, the EU has gone furthest in
integrating the economies of its members, and in being granted political
authority by these states, yet the problem of fraud and corruption has been
neglected by most policy and academic studies of the EU. The political science
literature on international institutions has ignored it. Fraud and corruption are
estimated to take 10-20% of the EU’s annual budget (Warner 2000). With the
recent creation of other regional trading associations (e.g. NAFTA), and
suggestions in policy circles that other countries ought to consider an
EUstyle currency unification, it is critical to know the potential costs, in
fraud and corruption, which might be associated with such actions.
Third, the EU has become an enormously important player in the politics
and economics of all the European states, members and non-members alike; it
has become similarly important in the relations of the European states with the
rest of the world.
What then are the sources of this corruption in the EU? Are they an
inevitable by-product of that organization’s structure and policies? Or, are they
the result of national behavior patterns being perpetuated and used by the
member states and other domestic actors in the newer and larger arena?
Definitions
To study fraud and corruption, we need to know what they are. Fraud is usually
defined as the wrongful appropriation of funds in the private sector, or by a
private actor against public funds, while corruption is defined as “behavior by
a public servant, whether elected or appointed, which involves a deviation
from his or her formal duties because of reasons of personal gain”
(LaPalombara 1994: 328, italics in the original; see also Klitgaard 1988, 20-4).
Corrupt officials may permit fraud.
Would that it were that simple. The dictionary definition of corruption is
that it is an “impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle: depravity”
(Merriam 1980, 253). It evokes decay and debasement. As Yves Mény states,
“corruption constitutes a violation of ethical norms that are protected by law”
(1997, 7). Applied to public office, this definition often becomes that quoted
above. There is also a sense that an act is corrupt if a public office holder4
somehow violates the public interest s/he was mandated to uphold. Corruption
signifies the “decay of the capacity of the citizenry and officials of a state to
subordinate the pursuit of private interests to the demands of the common good
or public interest” (Philp 1997, 24). But what is that public interest? As Mark
Philp notes, “the debate... isn’t so much about what corruption is” in that
there’s agreement that it involves something “being changed from ... a sound
condition to something unsound, debased” (Philp 1997, 29). The problem is in
deriving that standard: we are forced to “commit to concepts of the public good
or the nature and ends of public domain” (ibid., 30). Standards imply
agreement on the definition of the public good. Politics, however, is “partly
about the contestation and projection of the public interest” (Philp 1997, 29).
Further, it is possible that standards of office vary between levels of
administration, across regions even within the same polity. If corruption is the
“wrongful exercise of public duty in any community”, we have to decide what
the public duty is, either as an absolute, or as defined by the that community.
My concern here is with both phenomena occurring “against (the) financial
resources and allocative functions” of the EU (Mendrinou 1994: 82; cf.
Sherlock and Harding 1991: 22).
If we let the standards be defined by communities, we may have several
problems. One is the very real possibility that corruption may corrode
community standards, altering its sense of the public interest (della Porta and
Vannucci 1999, 10; Philp 1997, 25). If we seek to find the definition in the
community’s legal code, we have the problem that the legal system may also
contain corrupting laws: “that an act is legal does not always mean that it is not
corrupt” (Philp 25; Mény 1996, 311). Campaign financing laws (passed by
self-interested politicians) may have the effect of giving legal sanction to
behaviors by politicians and political parties which undermine elected and
appointed officials’ ability and incentive to uphold some common good, some
public interest.
Some scholars try to avoid relativism in their definitions by emphasizing
the distinction between politics and markets. In a non-corrupt polity, political
authority is separate from market pressures. In a corrupt polity, “market logic”
is applied to “political authority”  rights, public property, the legal system,
are sold for a price to individual or corporate purchasers (della Porta and
Vannucci 1999, 9; Shleifer and Vishny 1998, 91). Many scholars seem to limit
the universe of corrupt acts to cases in which these commodified aspects of
political authority, of the community, are sold for the personal gain of the
office holder. This seems to ignore the fact that the “seller” is often acting on
behalf of not just him or herself but for a political party. Further, how do we
decide when personal gain ends and public interest begins? As noted below,5
political economists hypothesize that politicians are self-interested office
seekers.
There is the additional problem that, in many instances, market logic is
being deliberately, openly, legally applied to public agencies and policies. The
response of some scholars is to argue that an act is corrupt when it “directly
subverts the distinction between the interests of the individual or group and the
responsibilities of the office” (Philp 1997, 42). The task then is to know what
those public office responsibilities are.
In the context of defining corruption as those actions which directly
subvert the public interest, rational choice analysis would see politics as
inherently corrupt. Individuals are assumed to be self-interested, means-end
rational; if civil servants and elected officials somehow uphold the public
interest, it is only by accident, an externality of individual self-seeking
behaviors. Institutions must exist which create cost-benefit structures that
discourage deviation from formal rules and responsibilities (cf. Becker 1968,
172). If politics and corruption are not the same thing, then they are not only
by dint of a legal system, which defines the realm of non-corrupt behavior.
Something as vague as the “public interest” can’t be countenanced. By
definition, the public interest is only the summation of the private interests of
all individuals in the population. Political candidates are assumed to seek
office for reasons of power and other personal advantages (Mayhew 1974;
Downs 1957), not out of a desire to uphold community interests (at best, that is
campaign rhetoric). Political parties are organized to facilitate the election of
self-interested individuals (Aldrich 1995), not to aggregate general interests or
to broadly represent the community. If they do, it is only by dint of the work of
(self-interested) constitutional engineers.
Nevertheless, even rational choice scholars usually tacitly assume that
there is something known as the “public trust.” Then, corruption occurs “when
officials use their positions of public trust for private gain” (Rose-Ackerman
1996, 365). Other scholars make specific reference to the legal system:
corruption occurs when private gain is pursued “in a way that violates formal
rules” (Manion 1996, 167; Nye 1967, 416; Nas, Price and Weber 1986, 108).
Here we are back to the problem that Philp raises, that a corrupt society and
polity may have few formal rules for officials to violate. One thinks of the
(self-serving) complaints of foreign investors over the lack of rules, lack of
transparency, of many of the countries in which they invest, and of efforts of
the West to impose its accountancy standards on all countries receiving
Western aid, and on multi-national accounting firms working in non-Western6
countries (Financial Times 6 June 2000, 17). The theory saving assumption is
that no matter what the polity, some positions in it have other-regarding
aspects and are thought to belong to the community as a whole, to exist for the
benefit of the community (positions occupied by “agents” to whom authority
has been delegated by “principals”  here, the community).
The fact that we are emphasizing a distinction between public and
private interests at all implies a “Western” bias. It was the West, after all,
which “invented” that distinction, and the West which has defined political
development for the rest of the world as the process of states arriving at
political systems which see and incorporate that distinction, with political
authority resting on that distinction. It is a hallmark of “advanced” societies
(RoseAckerman 1996, 365). (For a study of corruption in the EU, it may be
possible to hold to that definition, since the EU states were among the main
originators of that development criterion). Political corruption assumes a
public in whose interests individuals are supposed to act when occupying
public offices.
An alternative perspective is to ask what the purpose of political
authority is, and then define political corruption as that which subverts it. The
general definition might be “political corruption involves substituting rule in
the interests of an individual or group for those publicly endorsed practices
which effect an ordered resolution to conflicting individual or group interests”
(Philp 1997, 42). But, perhaps if that phrase is put simply, we are back to the
view that, as stated earlier, corruption occurs when private gain is pursued “in
a way that violates formal rules” – the institutions and laws which codify the
“publicly endorsed practices” (Manion 1996, 167).
We are not likely to resolve a centuries-long debate on the nature and
bases of political authority, nor on the definition of corruption. To design a
research program, we have to make pragmatic compromises. For the European
Union, one might like to use the EU’s own definition, assuming that it is the
“average” of the member states’ differing definitions of corruption. We might
also try to specify to what degree the EU’s definition differs from those of the
member states (see below on methods).
1 However, the EU has not explicitly
presented a definition. There seems to be an implicit understanding that “fraud,
mismanagement and nepotism” violate “standards of proper behaviour”, and
that those standards must be high for those who hold, or are staff members of,
1This could be done through surveys which ask respondents in different categories
(politicians, civil servants, business persons, trade unions...) to rank examples of behaviors
according to how corrupt those actions seem (cf. Peters and Welch 1978).7
EUlevel “high public office” (namely, the Commission; CIE 1999, 4-5). No
standards have been articulated for the member states.
Another issue which needs clarification is the definition of fraud: is it
conceptually or pragmatically different from corruption? In general terms, I am
inclined to think so, and will use the following definition: the deliberate
cheating of others in violation of a (formal) contract which has the effect of
illegally producing financial gain. Clearly the emphasis here is on the
deliberate nature of the act and on its fiscal impact: fraud involves deception,
deceit, and perhaps even extortion in order to gain or retain funds not rightfully
(legally) those of the perpetrator (Commission 1998a, 58; CIE 1999, 4). It does
not become corruption until it is done by someone who was to be acting in the
public interest but who, as has been discussed above, subverts the role of
her/his office to obtain private benefits.
I am tempted to define corruption, for the purposes of this research
project, as those acts of fraud which are done by or permitted by public
officials/office holders and their staffs, yet this may lose some nuances of
corruption in which it is public officials whose acts somehow violate and
subvert public interests and duties of office.
Aims of this Paper
This paper outlines four hypotheses, each of which is based upon a set of
theoretical premises discussed below. Recognizing its preliminary nature, the
paper then presents some evidence with which to evaluate the hypotheses. The
first premise is an agency hypothesis, which implies that international
organizations create new opportunities for fraud and corruption. The second
hypothesis takes the intergovernmentalist view to its logical conclusion. It
suggests that states (specifically their governments) deliberately tolerate fraud
in those sectors where they can reasonably expect to derive economic, and
hence potential electoral benefits. Taking my cue from Margaret Levi’s work
on states and taxation policy (1998), I call this the “predatory” hypothesis.
The third hypothesis is derived from policy network approaches. It
reasons that the EU provides multiple institutional points of access for rent-
seekers, and that rent-seeking coalitions will develop across institutional and
country boundaries. One would expect to find that current forms of fraud and
corruption exploit existing institutional arrangements, and that “corruption
coalitions” develop creative means for pursuing their interests. The fourth
hypothesis takes culture seriously. It anticipates that member states bring8
national patterns of corruption into international organizations, and, thus, that
most corruption in EU programs would occur in the states with a “tradition” of
corruption, particularly because, it argues, the cultural bases and political
institutions which give rise to these “traditions” do not change rapidly (Sabetti
1996; Ross 1997) over time.
Arguments about the causes of fraud and corruption.
Scholarship on the causes of fraud and corruption has been characterized by
two broad approaches; the first is based on the tenets of rational choice, the
other on cultural analyses.
2 The first consists mainly of economists and legal
scholars, focuses on individual agency and incentives in two broad categories:
one, when individuals whose responsibility it is to ensure compliance with
rules and regulations are themselves “corrupted,” i.e., they do not enforce nor
prosecute violations of legal and administrative procedures (e.g. Della Porta
1996). The second occurs when there are opportunities for fraud due to lax
regulation, inadequate oversight, or limited procedural requirements (what the
World Bank terms “weak institutional capacity”) which are then exploited by
various actors (e.g., Geddes and Neto 1992; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996).
As to why it happens more often in some places or times than others,
political economists emphasize several factors. All are, however, based on the
nature of incentives facing an individual, and the associated costs and benefits.
The key factor behind corruption is the discretionary power of bureaucrats and
the demand for the resources they control (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Ibid. 1999;
Ades and Di Tella 1997, 1023-4; Gray and Kaufmann 1998, 8; Mauro 1998,
12). In fraud, the focus is on the risk of detection and extent of penalties
balanced against pecuniary benefits. Indeed, most of the research on fraud and
corruption focuses on the incentive structures of government bureaucrats
(Ades and Di Tella 1997; Leff 1964; Schleifer and Vishny 1993; Bag 1997).
The solution, according to many political economists, is to introduce
“market competition” into previously regulated and subsidized areas (Bliss and
Di Tella 1997: 1005). As Mauro (1998, 11) argues, “Since the ultimate source
of rent-seeking behavior is the availability of rents, corruption is likely to
occur where restrictions and government intervention lead to the presence of
such excessive profits.” The implication is that there is more fraud where the
2This project is not directly concerned with the debate about the effects of fraud and
corruption on economic growth, political stability, or related phenomena. For that, see
Johnston 1986; Bliss and Di Tella 1997; Della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Heidenheimer
1969; Mauro 1995.9
government intervenes in particular market sectors, i.e., agriculture in the case
of the EU.
The legalistic approach to a solution argues that corruption can be
curbed through more and better oversight and stronger sanctions – the latter
raising the costs of corruption, the former the likelihood that those costs will
have to be paid. Institutions must monitor programs and enforce rules,
sanctioning infractions. The key is to avoid any office having a monopoly (or
even overwhelming discretion) in the distribution of a resource (Manzetti and
Blake 1996; Andrews and Montinola 1998; cf. Banfield 1975: 600; Sherlock
and Harding 1991: 25). In this view, the failure to increase enforcement stems
from the vested interests of those who profit from corruption, and from
devoting inadequate resources to enforcement.
The legal and political economist views, emphasizing human agency and
incentives, imply that the EU’s fraud problem is due to a corruptible
bureaucracy, the existence of programs that are vulnerable to fraud by third
parties, and too few checks and balances to counter administrative monopolies
(despite the many levels of authority and decision-making). However, the
political and legal solutions fail to take into account the peculiar structure of
international organizations, including the possible differences in attitudes
towards corruption which may affect member countries’ institutional responses
to corruption, and its peculiar principal/agent structure: we have the
conundrum that the member states, as principals, have delegated to themselves
the collection and distribution of an enormous percentage of the EU’s budget,
and have also delegated to themselves the operation of most of its regulatory
structure. Thus, much of the time, the agent is also the principal. If combating
corruption involves policing the agents, then it is the member states which
must be controlled.
The political economist and legalist approaches also fail to recognize the
fact that governments and international organizations often have strong policy
reasons for not allowing the so-called free market to operate in specific sectors.
Many of the EU’s most important and expensive programs (e.g. Common
Agricultural Program, Structural Funds) were deliberately created to counter
free market forces. Furthermore, research shows that, depending on how they
are implemented, market reforms toward a “free” market “can be used as new
means to pursue corrupt ends” (Manzetti and Blake 1996, 662; Johnson,
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón 1998; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996).
Corruption and Fraud in International Organizations10
What implications and hypotheses can we draw from the literature on
international institutions? It is often claimed that international organizations
(“regimes”) raise the “anticipated costs of violating others’ property rights”
(Keohane 1984: 97; cf. Garrett 1992), thus reducing the costs and risks of
economic interaction. Some have argued that corruption, as a form of rent-
seeking and hence a source of economic inefficiency, is destined to decline as
national economies grow interdependent and are more exposed to international
economic competition (Kitschelt 1996). That pressure presumably would apply
to organizations such as the EU, which face competitive external pressures
which should make corruption costly. Yet, while that expectation may be
rational at the macro-level, the “micro-motives” of individuals, firms, political
parties and also governments still could make it rational to engage in corrupt
practices.
The rationalist perspective, which has dominated the field, “assumes that
states rely on (international) institutions when doing so will promote their
interests” (Martin 1997, 7; cf. Keohane 1984; Moravcsik 1998). States agree to
international institutions when doing so will further some national interest (I
am ignoring how that interest is defined or discovered), provided there are
rules to sanction non-cooperative behavior (cheating). Yet one hallmark of an
international organization’s legal system is its inability to do just that.
Scholars of international regimes persist in arguing that regimes, by the
fact that they exist, have at least a rudimentary legal system. The reasoning is
that states would never agree to cooperate and pool or delegate sovereignty if
there were no way to discover and sanction non-cooperative behavior. That the
legal forces are inadequate would be explained by states’ inherent concern
with retaining sovereignty. If so, for a state to be rational and to agree to an
international organization, the benefits of the organization would have to far
outweigh the risks of others cheating, or the state would have to see, as part of
the benefits, the possibility of itself cheating the others to a greater degree than
the others could cheat it.
Applying this assumption to the states’ perspective first, states see fraud
and corruption in an international organization as a marginal cost to be
discounted by the varied benefits derived from the organization. One of these
benefits may actually be the fraud, which serves as a side-payment to various
key constituencies, or as a direct benefit to the policy-maker (cf. Shleifer and
Vishny 1998; Ades and Di Tella 1997).
3 In both cases, the costs are borne by
3Margaret Levi’s “Predatory Theory of Rule” provides a detailed justification for a11
diffuse, unorganized individuals spread across the member states. Second,
taking a rationalist approach one step further, the effect of the international
institution may be that of broadening the arena for those actors already inclined
to corrupt behavior, providing them with new opportunities and resources.
Implicitly recognizing this possibility, Italy’s Treasury Minister at one time
said of southern Italy, it “is not just an Italian problem but a European
problem” (New York Times, 15 Nov. 1998, A1).
Indeed, the EU’s peculiar institutional arrangements may contribute to
fraud, as well as explain why there has not been more and better action to deal
with it. For example, while the Commission supervises budget expenditures,
80% of the disbursement thereof is in the hands of the member states. Most of
the EU’s “own resources,” such as funds obtained from the Common External
Tariff and the Value Added Tax, are collected for it by the members. Thus,
should a member government find it politically useful to tolerate fraud in a
particular economic sector (e.g. agriculture), the fact that it has jurisdiction
over EU funds within its territory lowers the risk of discovery. Most of the
detection and pursuit of fraud and corruption, as well as the prosecution of it,
are reserved to the policing and legal systems of the specific member states. In
effect, this makes EU fraud a collective action problem (cf. Frey 1991, 13-19):
member states are able to free ride on, or defraud, the EU because the harm
caused is dispersed across all the members, while the gains are country-
specific.
These possibilities are not addressed by the current scholarship on
international regimes. The major recent work on the subject of European
integration contains no mention of corruption or fraud, and writes as if the
European Union’s legal system is adequate to the task (Moravcsik 1998).
Moravcsik goes on to explain that states have no problem delegating
sovereignty for “adjudication, implementation, and enforcement” because
those “are narrower functions.” Governments “can afford looser control and
greater efficiency” (1998, 76-7). But it is difficult to see how allowing the
policing and enforcement of EU rules to be carried out primarily by the 15
member states’ interior, judicial and defense ministries could be seen as a
delegation of sovereignty. I would argue that governments have retained tight
control, and lost potential efficiencies.
Some institutionalist scholars suggest that fraud is an unintended
perspective such as this (1988). The political economy research on rent-seeking by policy-
makers (governments), not just by interest groups, also leads to this expectation (Mitchell
1990, 90; McChesney 1991, 74; Appelbaum and Katz 1987, 686).12
consequence of creating new institutions (Pierson 1996), with multiple levels
of policy networks and informal arrangements (CIE 1999; Pappi and Henning
1999). What may appear to be fraud or corruption is merely a form of
incompetence and a reflection of inadequate resources: the inability of officials
and businesses to apply EU regulations because of their extreme complexity,
their contradictions, the lack of staff, and the competing jurisdictions to which
they are subject (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988; Pag and Wessels 1988, 169).
4
Yet, pushing the idea of state interests in international institutions to its logical
conclusion implies that fraud may be an intended consequence of creating new
institutions, or at least a consequence surreptitiously welcomed by states as a
useful tool in domestic political competition. After all, states can be selective
in the areas to which they devote policing power, spending proportionately
more resources on those which clearly affect state revenues (François and
Vandercammen 1988, 34) and government electoral futures.
Fraud may indeed occur when principals cannot exercise sufficient
oversight. A number of scholars have argued that the EU can, in fact, be best
understood as an organization playing host to various principal/agent relations
(Dogan 1997; Franchino 2000; Pollack 1997). Having delegated certain
powers to (new) supranational institutions, the member-states may be seen as
the principals, and the staff of these institutions as the agents. This view
implies that reducing EU fraud will be largely a matter of restricting the
behavior of the agents. However, in the case of the EU, the principals designed
the institutions so that much of the implementation authority and responsibility
remains with them, thus turning themselves into their own agents. This creates
an opportunity, if not an outright incentive, for the principal, as agent, to cheat.
Policy Networks
In a challenge to the inter-governmentalist view that state interests largely
account for policy developments in the EU, a number of scholars point to
“multi-level governance” and “policy networks” which appear to have emerged
in the EU (Bache1998; Hooghe 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Marks, Hooghe
and Blank 1996; Mazey and Richardson 1996; Rhodes, Bache and George
1996). These networks, with cris-crossing, transnational layers of governance
and/or interest group linkages between actors with converging interests and/or
policy expertise, may begin informally and become institutionalized.
According to this literature, policy networks informally link a variety of actors
to EU institutions, allow for the pursuit of interest, and account for most policy
4Philp notes that incompetence is not corruption because the former does not actively
challenge the distinction between public authority and private interests (1997, 42-3).13
formation and output. Strategies are heavily influenced by available venues,
including transnational coalition partners (cf. Guiraudon 2000). States do not
necessarily encapsulate these interests and then represent them at the
negotiating table. Studies up to now have only dealt with legal, or at worst
clientelistic, policy networks. But if the EU’s structure, and its relationship to
its members, fosters the development of such networks, and if corruption is
one of the means used by states to pursue interest, we should expect the EU to
yield new corrupt networks as well (cf. Cartier-Bresson 1997).
Cultural Sources of Corruption
Another category of scholars suggest that cultural patterns are significant, and
can lead to differences in the use of discretionary power as well as in the legal
definition of what constitutes corruption or fraud (Hood 1996; Mény 1992).
5
Research on culture tends to explain corrupt practices as manifestations of
norms and standards which are state and even regionally specific (Banfield
1958; Geertz 1973; Hedetoft and Kastoryano 2000; Klitgaard 1988; Médard
1997; Putnam 1993). Scholars in this field contend that the very institutional
structures which the agency and institutionalist approaches claim foster or
inhibit corruption and fraud are culturally derived, and culturally embedded.
Strategies and behavior patterns are culturally dependent (Ross 1997, 46-7).
According to this view, corruption and fraud in international organizations are
national “exports”, traceable to particular countryor regionally based
cultures. If corruption is defined as abuse of public office for private gain, with
abuse, gain and the responsibilities of public office defined by a community’s
standards (“publicly endorsed”), then it is inevitable that culture, broadly
understood, becomes a variable. From the cultural perspective, culture is also a
factor, because if the agents to which the management of most EU programs
and finances is delegated are also the principals, then the level of fraud and
corruption will vary according to the traditions and standards of each principal.
PART II: RESEARCH HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY
The implication of the agency and institutionalist perspectives is that the state
will, then, “cheat,” or, in the case of the EU, be involved in or tolerate fraud in
various sectors both for the gain of the governing parties, and for political gain
(via economic benefits to key constituents). The implication of the network
approach is that the sources and extent of corruption vary according to actors’
5The political economy, or agency, approach tends to introduce culture as an “error term”
when agency and incentive structures do not explain outcomes (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 229;
North 1981, 50-7).14
creative responses to institutional opportunities. The culturalist perspective
expects that those states which succumb to the temptation to cheat will be
those with a prior tradition of domestic fraud and corruption.
I have distilled the arguments to four hypotheses. First, if the agency
hypothesis that international organizations create new opportunities for fraud
is correct, then I expect to find that the frequency of fraud in EU programs has
been relatively proportionate across the four countries, and that any increases
will demonstrate roughly the same ratio when institutional and programmatic
changes in the EU create new incentives.
If the second (the “predatory”) hypothesis, that states (specifically their
governments)
6 deliberately tolerate fraud in those sectors where they can
reasonably expect to derive economic, and hence potential electoral benefits, is
correct, I would expect to find the rate and amount of abuse of EU programs to
increase in the period prior to a scheduled national election (recognizing that
some elections are called early).
7 The increase(s) would most likely be in those
sectors which are major constituents and supporters of the dominant party
parties in the governing coalition. I would expect enforcement mechanisms to
be state-centered, with little role given to the supranational institutions, and I
would expect enforcement to be weak. I would expect that those who profit
from fraud or irregularities have political links to those who write and/or
enforce the rules.
Third, if the policy network approach is correct, we should see
corruption and fraud networks developing, utilizing multiple levels of access
and across a many states. In some ways, this hypothesis only predicts that
underlying fraud and corruption in the EU are intricate, tangled arrangements
between actors at a variety of levels and in a variety of states: If there is multi-
level governance sustained by policy networks, then there is multi-level fraud
sustained by criminal networks. The EU will have created a transnational,
internal market for fraud.
Fourth, if the cultural hypothesis that member states bring national
patterns of corruption into international organizations is correct, I expect to
find that most corruption of EU programs occurs in the states with a “tradition”
6By “government” I am following standard European usage of the word: the parties or party
currently holding the cabinet and office of prime minister (cf. Steiner 1998, 63).
7This hypothesis parallels the logic of research on the political manipulation of the economy
(“pump priming”) for electoral purposes, but imputes a deliberate, rent-seeking motive to the
state and its current government.15
of corruption: more so in Italy and Belgium, less so in the case of France, and
even less in the UK. I would also expect that parties which have a history of
illegal financing will have incorporated EU programs into those financing
arrangements.16
To begin the research, I conducted interviews with EU officials in
UCLAF (now OLAF),
8 the European Parliament’s budgetary control
committee (COCOBU), DG Competition (IV), DG Regio (XVI), and the Court
of Auditors. The records of the European Court of Auditors, which issued its
first report in 1978, may be considered primary documents to assess the site
and frequency of irregular uses of EU funds. Such irregularities are the first
indicator of possible fraudulent and corrupt activities, and these first signs can
then be substantiated by referring to investigations carried out by COCOBU
and UCLAF/OLAF. Major national newspapers and weekly investigative
journals can provide secondary corroboration of prominent and particularly
egregious cases.
9
Coding states for fraud and corruption is no easy task, and warrants the
use of multiple measures. One measure relies on survey data, such as that
which generates the rankings of Transparency International, correlated with
those of other corruption indices, such as the Business International
Corporation’s Country Assessment Service (68 countries for 1980-1983 and 30
countries for 1971-1979; see Mauro 1995, 683). TI’s rankings begin in 1995;
but TI has also compiled, from other sources, rankings covering 1980-1993.
Economists and political scientists have indicated a general acceptance of the
rankings (e.g., Ades and Di Tella 1997; Lancaster and Montinola 1997). If
states do not rapidly increase or decrease their levels of corruption (cf. Cox
1987), then it would be possible to extrapolate backwards in time, and possibly
it would be reasonable to assume that the relative standing of my four cases
has been stable (TI’s historical data bear this out, though there have been
changes in the precise scores the countries have received).
10
Regarding documentation, Court of Auditor reports and OLAF reports,
as well as reports from similar national agencies, are difficult to use
consistently. Reporting procedures vary by year and by country. Cases are
usually not isolated by country or sub-national region, but by economic sector
(e.g., fraud against the VAT). Moreover, descriptions in the reports are
sketchy. Some countries do not keep track of reported domestic cases; it is
only in recent years that states have been required to report suspected fraud to
the EU (to UCLAF/OLAF), and their compliance with this mandate, and with
8Respectively, Unité coordinatif de la lutte anti-fraude; Office Européen de lutte anti-fraude.
9Of course, any enumeration of cases will be approximate; it is highly unlikely that complete
accuracy is possible. However, using the resources enumerated will produce a significant
improvement over what now exists (nothing), and can be cross-checked through interviews
with officials (cf Lancaster and Montinola 1997, 193).
10Transparency International, “Historical Comparisons” consulted at
http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/histor.htm17
the mandate to send follow-up reports on the prosecution and fund recovery,
has been uneven (but perhaps that in itself is an indicator, albeit very difficult
to quantify). It also seems to be impossible to know whether a country
reporting a high level of fraud or irregularities is just good at detecting those
phenomena, whether they are being forthright in reporting, or whether they do
have high levels (cf. HL 1989).
PART III EVIDENCE
Structure of the EEC/EU
Established in 1958, the EU originally consisted of the Commission, the
Council, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice. The Commission’s remit has
been to propose and oversee the implementation of “legislation” and to oversee
and enforce the member states’ adherence to the articles of the Treaties. It now
has 20 Commissioners, who act essentially as cabinet ministers overseeing a
set of “general directorates” which run the day to day operations of the EEC.
Upon unanimous nomination by the member states, and after approval en bloc
by the Parliament, the Commissioners are collectively appointed to a five year
term. The Council has long been the primary locus of power in the EU, as it is
comprised of the member states’ cabinet ministers who vote on and amend
proposals coming from the Commission. During the twice yearly formal
meetings of the Prime Ministers (and the French Head of State), they attempt
to reach agreement on difficult issues (such as monetary union), and give
direction to the Commission’s proposals. The European Parliament initially
was nothing more than an advisory body, or a nod to “democracy.” Its
members began to be directly elected by citizens in 1979, and not until 1993
did the Parliament gain any significant influence on EU policy making. The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) was established mainly to keep the
supranational institutions in check, not to enforce the member states’
adherence to the Treaties and regulations (Alter 2000). It secondarily was
meant to clarify interpretations of the legal texts of the Treaties.
In 1977, almost twenty years after the EEC’s founding, and in response
to adverse publicity about fraud, the member states launched a Court of
Auditors to provide audits of the EEC’s budget. In 1992 they accorded the
Court status as a completely independent institution with the obligation to
provide a statement of assurance as to the regularity and legality of
expenditures in the EU’s budget (Harden, White and Donnelly 1995). In 1988,
again in response to adverse publicity, this time via press reports on findings of
the Court of Auditors, the EEC created a separate “anti-fraud unit” to facilitate
the Commission’s efforts to coordinate the detection and prosecution of fraud18
amongst the member states. This agency, “UCLAF”, was modified and re-
named OLAF after questions about the management of the Commission itself,
leading to the Commission’s resignation in 1999.
I now turn to the hypotheses themselves. First, regarding agency theory,
Commission interviews indicated that most fraud takes place where most of the
money is–that is, fraud against the EU budget is proportionate for the amount
of funds a country receives for any given program. Thus, it seems the EU does
provide new opportunities for all countries to exploit its budget. Some officials
noted that EU funds are seen as a “gift” or “freebie” and so the member states
do not subject those funds to the same strict controls they do their own funds.
That view was countered by a UK Audit official, who noted that all EU funds
are reviewed by the same procedures and held to the same stringent standards
as domestic-origin funds. In the country often said to have marked regional
cultures   Italy Court of Auditor officials noted that irregularities and
waste, if not also outright fraud, are present throughout Italy, there are no
regional (and, implicitly, cultural) differences.
While most scholars of international relations assume that states do not
join international organizations if there are not adequate means of preventing
other states from cheating on the agreement, the EU’s structure suggests that,
provided they all have similar opportunities for cheating, states may create
international organizations with little regard for rule enforcement. Indeed, the
EEC originated with very weak legal enforcement mechanisms pertaining to
the actions of the member states. Access to Community legal remedies is
generally weak throughout the member states and uneven across them (Conant
2002; . The member states have been keen to establish costly subsidy
programs, but not keen to establish policing mechanisms. Only those states,
such as the United Kingdom, which have been major net contributors to the EU
budget, have pushed hard to increase anti-fraud enforcement procedures and
investigations. The extent of subsidies, the tolerance for abuse, the lack of
cooperation with EU authorities investigating such abuse, along with the fact
that EU citizens have a voice only in the weakest of EU institutions (the
European Parliament) can lead one to question the intentions of the member
state governments – do they regard fraud merely as an externality of the
Common Market?
Agency theory expects that institutions strongly affect actor behavior,
and that, for the most part, cultural/normative differences are irrelevant. The
actual evidence may not support that view. Each of the member states has anti-
fraud, anti-corruption and auditing offices, as well as the ability to prosecute
corruption and fraud. Each of them also has competence in the investigation19
and prosecution of competition law violations (Laudati, 1995). There are
variations in some of the powers granted these institutions, and it may be worth
exploring these, and especially their political origins, or the political coalitions
behind them, further. In France, the degree of independence of the judiciary
seems to have been more a matter of political interests than of legal,
institutional authority. And when the Finance Inspectorate itself takes bribes
and kickbacks on audits it is legally authorized to conduct, then it does not
seem to matter much that like other countries, Italy in this case, has a Finance
Inspectorate with auditing and policing powers.
11 Perhaps like patronage
(Shefter 1994), we can speak of a “constituency for corruption and fraud”.
The predatory hypothesis, that states deliberately tolerate fraud and/or
try to create EU institutions and rules, which facilitate it, appears beyond
testing. However, there is evidence that states were not diligent in their anti-
fraud efforts: the structure of the EU, its main program (CAP), and what one
scholar has termed the “chimera” of enforcement mechanisms (Harding 1997)
do not reflect member state concern with fraud or its control.
Relationship between Structure and Fraud
The vast majority of the EEC’s budget goes towards varieties of agriculture
subsidies, known as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). French President
Charles de Gaulle’s main argument for the CAP was that French industry could
not afford to subsidize its agriculture on its own. There was no question of
NOT subsidizing agriculture, it was merely a matter of spreading the costs.
Germany agreed (Moravcsik 1998). In 1958 when the member states met to
elaborate plans for the CAP, 23% of the French population was in agriculture,
35% in Italy, 15% for Germany, 14% for the Netherlands, 13% for Belgium
and 17% for Luxembourg. Agriculture was 12% of France’s GDP, 14.6% of
Italy’s, and 8% for Germany (von der Groeben 1985, 71-2). All six founding
states had costly and elaborate market support and quota systems, which were
politically unthinkable to eliminate or reduce. Parties and politicians who had
tried to do so destroyed or jeopardized their political futures (Keeler 1987, 77-
8; Warner 1998; Moravcsik 1998, 179-97). Thus, the political solution was to
harmonize systems and create the CAP. Until the 1980s, the CAP grew to
consume almost 80% of the Community’s budget. At that point, some CAP
programs were re-worked and put under the “Structural Funds” rubric, making
it appear that agriculture was taking up less of the annual budget (now about
50%, with another 10-20% granted via the Structural Funds).
11Cases reported in Tribunali di Milano e Napoli (1996), pp. 27-31.20
The substantial price differentials from what the world market would
pay, and duties paid or avoided depending on country of origin or destination,
and product composition and quality, create significant incentives to commit
fraud. For instance, import duties may vary by 15% per kilo depending on
whether the product was high quality prime beef, or offal (Sieber 1998, 6).
Through the 1980s, there were 400 different classifications for milk, and 80 for
beef (House of Lords 1989, 17). With prices on the world market often five to
ten times lower than in the EC, and with the exporter eligible for a “refund” to
compensate for his “loss”, export fraud in dairy, beef and cereals has been
substantial.
Further contributing to the potential for fraud is the fact that in many
member states, including several of the biggest agricultural producers (France,
Germany, Italy), agricultural policy and administration is heavily influenced by
the very groups meant to be regulated. Ties between many governing parties
and the farming organizations are strong (Conradt 1993; Heinze 1992; Keeler
1987; von Carmon-Taubadel 1993). In France, for instance, the national
farmers’ unions have official voice on the many national and regional and local
farm administrative bodies which write the rules and manage the programs
(Keeler 1987). In many countries, for the purposes of various subsidies and
crop “interventions” (in which the product never goes to market but is put in
storage or destroyed), it is the local farmers cooperative which “verifies” the
extent of the crop and issues the subsidy check for the farmer. The Court of
Auditors has noted that Italy gives farmers ten days advance notice of
upcoming inspections of declared field plantings (instead of the permitted
two), and that French authorities also routinely give farmers more than the EU
stipulated 48 hour warning. Required field measurements sometimes are not
carried out (CA 1997, 79). After describing a CAP management system in
Italy, an Italian judge and legal scholar stated bluntly, “(i)t goes without saying
that the division of responsibility between the authority responsible for
providing financial support and that responsible for monitoring is absurd”
(Giordano 1990, 56) As the monitoring system is “absurd”.
UCLAF officials indicated some suspicion that member states tolerate
some forms of fraud because of the economic benefits it brings. The examples
cited involved the two busiest ports in Europe, Rotterdam and Hamburg, from
which fraudulent transfers of goods have frequently taken place (UCLAF
interview, 4 June 1998; cf. CA 1997, 21). The Netherlands and Germany both
profit from being the main point of transfer for goods entering and leaving
Europe; only after other German Länder complained that too much trade
(hence jobs and tax revenue) was, for no obvious economic or logistical
reason, going through Hamburg did the German government criticize lax21
procedures at the Hamburg port. This is not a signal that a member state
government itself makes corrupt use of EU funds, but that it may have an
interest in tolerating administrative weaknesses when they work to its
economic and political benefit. As a legal scholar notes, “the member States
are rather indulgent” towards dubious, even fraudulent, practices (Delmas-
Marty 1981, 97).
Further supporting the hypothesis that member states tolerate fraud when
it serves their economic interests is the fact that where states stand to lose the
most, they are noticeably more assiduous in their monitoring and enforcement
exercises. For products on which the states impose high excise taxes, tax
evasion due to fraud produces a significant loss for the states themselves.
Tobacco products, especially cigarettes, due to the high VAT on them, are an
area in which states have an incentive to cooperate, and UCLAF/OLAF has
been positive about the cooperation it received from Spain, Portugal, France
and Greece. Officials remarked that Belgium is indifferent, seeing the cigarette
trade, even illegal, as benefitting its port; and that the Netherlands is less
cooperative because a high volume of cigarettes going through Rotterdam
represents a large economic benefit to the area (UCLAF interview, 4 June
1998). A House of Lords study noted that “The vast bulk of VAT collected by
Member States is destined for the national exchequer. This sector is therefore
unusual: any fraud by an individual would affect national revenues much more
than Community revenues.” Predictably, in view of states’ pecuniary interests,
the Commission’s concern is not just that importers and others are evading the
VAT, but on ensuring “that the Member States paid over the correct amount to
the Commission” (HL 1989, 14). We see again the pattern of member states
not delegating supervisory authority, not delegating adequate powers so that
the supranational agency can actually monitor compliance: although the
Commission is required to check whether each member state’s “VAT own
Resource contribution has been correctly established … (t)he Commission was
conscious of its limited powers to conduct investigations in this area. It was
also dissatisfied about its access to Member States’ VAT statistics to calculate
the contributions due” (HL 1989, 14).
Clearly, the states’ priorities have not been on control systems. In a 1994
report, the Italian Court of Auditors lamented the “weakness of inspection
services” in the Ministry of Agriculture, and noted that the Ministry itself had
signaled its structural inadequacies in the area of control, which meant that
Italy was barely, if at all, meeting the minimum inspections required by the
Community. The report concluded that the central fraud inspection office was22
unable to carry out its duties.
12 An indication of the extent of the problem is
evident in the fact that the EU has no commonly applied definition of fraud.
13
Thus, what constitutes fraud in Germany may not constitute fraud in Belgium.
There is considerable variation across states in how the Community’s interests
may be represented in a legal procedure concerning Community funds. From
the Community’s perspective, when it comes to obtaining legal standing, it is
best if the fraud occurred in Belgium, France, Luxembourg or Spain. There is
also considerable variation in applicable penalties, with member states
obligated only to ensure that penalties have a deterrent effect (an
unenforceable obligation). European legal scholars have raised doubts about
the effectiveness of the states’ existing penalties, including their deterrent
effects (Delmas-Marty 1994, 61). States’ priorities are clear in the fact that it
was 37 years after the EEC was established that they passed the first
framework legislation meant to make it possible to harmonize penalties for
fraud against Community funds. Yet as of 2002, they have not followed
through with actual harmonization. This, along with the open borders of the
internal market, encourages forum shopping (Grasso1989, 254-5).
14 So too
does variation in the effectiveness of member states’ legal systems. It is
perhaps no surprise that Italy seems to have a comparative advantage in
“producing” fraud.
While there has been an increase in the powers of the ECJ and the
Parliament, it is noteworthy that the Commission’s only means of
“enforcement” has been to bring member states before the ECJ for
“infringements” of the EU Treaties or regulations. Yet, even in cases of
obvious corruption, such as when a Greek minister tried to cover up a case of
fraud against Community funds in 1986, the Court has never had the power to
impose penalties. Only recently did the member states, via the Council, agree
12La Stampa, 14 Aug. 1994
13In 1995, the member states agreed to a “Convention” which included a common definition
of fraud. As of 1999, only Germany and the Netherlands had ratified it; as of 2001, a few
more states had, but the Commission would not list the states which had NOT ratified it.
14As Grasso elaborates, reaching a noteworthy conclusion, “the financial interests of the
Community receive very varied protection under the various criminal law systems. The
differences concern the nature or level of the penalty, the definition of punishable acts and
the applicability of certain general institutions ... With regard to criminal law in the economic
filed, marked differences between various countries with respect to sanctions for criminal
acts of identical negative value could constitute a phenomenon likely to distort competition.
In particular, where provision is made for fines for infringements, the risk of criminal
sanctions may become a commercial risk in many cases. Thus the amount of the fine
becomes a cost that can be reflected in the price of the finished product. Consequently, if
between two Community countries there is a difference in the level of penalties, firms
established in the country with the lighter penalties have a clear competitive advantage.”23
to give the Commission the right to levy and collect fines for violations of
market competition rules, and to withhold future subsidies in agriculture and
regional development. As late as 1989, there were no Community regulations
for minimum standards of customs inspections of goods leaving or entering the
EEC. The states set up their own implementing provisions. Likewise for the
administration of agricultural programs, in which, on the basis of unverified
statements by the states of their need, the Commission automatically grants
funds to the states. Only later, during the annual accounting procedure, are the
states required to account for expenditures, reporting irregularities. And at that
point, with the money spent, they have no incentive to do so: should they not
be able to recover funds from the individual or business in question, they owe
the Community those funds. As the House of Lords noted in 1988, “Member
States have been unwilling to notify the Commission of established fraud
unless they are certain to collect the amounts due (from the fraudster), or
unless they will not be required to pay up the sums to the Community. The
result is that (to quote a European Parliament report) the Commission ‘has
little idea of what is actually going on.’” (HL 1989, 13).
Aggravating the situation is the fact that while most agricultural and
other trade is transnational, both within the Community and between it and
third countries, administrative and judicial systems are national. Ten years ago,
the Court of Auditors reported that the “Member States’ control systems are
not designed to cope effectively” with that situation. While there have been ad
hoc efforts, and some work by the Commission, to improve coordination, the
Member State governments have done little to overcome the significant gap
between the scope of the Community’s internal market (and international
trade) and their nation-state based legal and administrative systems. Gathering
of evidence requires cooperation between numerous national and local
jurisdictions, evidence admissible in one state is not in another; the suspect(s)
may have to be extradited (which generally does not happen in revenue
crimes), and the bank accounts may be in Switzerland (not an EU member) or
offshore.
15 These conditions have allowed not only domestic special interests
to take advantage of Community programs, but also organized crime and third
country nationals.
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15As the House of Lords noted in 1988, “Traditionally revenue offences have not been
extraditable. This reflects the international law principle that states do not assist one another
to enforce their revenue law, and this principle has not been adapted to take account of
Community law, under which Community money belongs in effect to all Member States.”
(House of Lords 1989, 30).
16Weighing against the hypothesis are statements from DG Competition and DG Internal
Market officials that the states generally act in good faith, on occasion they may be
“economic” with the facts they report to the Commission, and that most cases of non-24
The rational choice institutionalist perspective would account for these
feeble monitoring and enforcement mechanisms with reference to principal-
agent dynamics. The states could not agree on or find a method of ensuring
that, if they delegated real administrative, monitoring and enforcement powers
to supranational institutions, the agents would not “behave in ways that
diverge from the preferences of the principals” (Pollock 2000, 6). Yet this
could imply that the concern of the member states is that the agents would be
too effective in monitoring the behavior of the principals! If the concern of the
member states were that other states would be defecting from the Treaties’
obligations, then a supranational institution would have been better situated
than each of them individually to monitor the behavior of the other states. It
appears as though the states have made various agreements they don’t really
want to keep, and the best way to not keep them is to retain the bulk of
administrative, monitoring and enforcement powers.
Alternatively, the historical institutionalist perspective would argue that
fraud is an unintended, unforeseen consequence of the EU’s structures, and
that the reason states have not adequately addressed the problem is that the
current institutional structures raise the costs of change. Yet when sufficiently
motivated by domestic economic concerns, states have shown a striking ability
to change their domestic and supranational institutions–the introduction of the
euro is a prime example.
Policy Networks
The policy network hypothesis is supported at least by the multiple references
made in Court of Auditor and OLAF reports about organized crime, criminal
networks, being the major perpetrators of fraud in the EU/against the
Community budget. It is known that much of CAP fraud is coordinated by
organized crime syndicates which operate in many countries: the Commission
counts at least fifty known syndicates (Commission 1998a, 20). These
observations are similarly echoed in European Parliament reports. EU fraud
cases typically involve nationals from at least two member states, often three
or more, and the EU nationals usually work in coordination with non-EU
nationals in Eastern Europe, or the Third World. As judged by a
comprehensive study of Community fraud in France and Germany between
1960 and 1982, criminal networks developed almost immediately in response
to the opportunities created by the institutions of the EEC (Roche-Pire and
compliance are not “political” or related to fraud or corruption but to misunderstandings or
different interpretations of directives. Interviews, DG Competition, DG Internal Market,
Brussels, 7 Feb. 2001.25
Delmas-Marty 1982).
Culture as a factor
The cultural hypothesis is both upheld and contradicted by statements from
interviewees, and from the documentary record. As a Commission official
noted, one of the biggest fraud cases (in the European Social Funds, a subset of
the Structural Funds) opened in the Netherlands in the late 1990s, where one
might not have expected it. Another official commented that member states do
seem to have different norms and standards, while several others argued that,
as said above, the amount of fraud and what country it occurs in depends on
the volume of funds and the specific mechanisms in EU programs. Inquiries
about regional variations within countries on the application of Regional
policies and competition yielded similar statements. An official dealing with
Italian regional policy stated flatly that northern regions could be just as
problematic as southern, and that if the south seems to have more problems, it
is because of institutional features of southern regional governments, many of
which retain the authority to make what are essentially administrative
decisions. Hence, when a regional government falls, no one can “sign the
checks” or authorize program implementation. One could argue about whether
that institutional feature, which predominates in the south, is itself a result of
cultural traits, or of “political history”. A public procurement officer in the UK
noted that in EU negotiations about procurement rules, it is the northern states
that would prefer looser procedures to facilitate efficient contracting, and the
southern which argue that the rules must be fixed and detailed to prevent fraud
and corruption (author interviews, Jan.-Feb.-March, 2001, Brussels, London).
This implies that there are differences in public norms across states.
A word about corruption
Because elections are still member state based, including those for the
European Parliament, corruption is largely a member state problem, not,
despite the extensive publicity in 1999, a problem within the supranational EU
institutions such as the Commission. Newsworthy cases such as Elf in France,
shady financing of Helmut Kohl’s CDU in Germany, Enimont in Italy, and the
lesser known but more frequent local and regional cases have at their base
efforts by political parties and politicians to attain more financing.
Decentralization in the name of democratization in many European countries
has brought with it the need for more elections (to regional and local26
governments), and, inevitably, for more parties, politicians and their campaigns
to be funded. While those needs have not been adequately met with legal
funding, neither has the need for more oversight. Corruption most often occurs
through kickback schemes on public works contracts, contracts which account
for 10-20% of the combined GDP of the EU states. And, to the extent that
these collusive arrangements violate the EU’s many regulations on public
procurement, it is here that corruption intersects with the EU. The EU seems to
be working at cross-purposes: in promoting more democracy through
decentralization while promoting more competition in government contracting,
the EU and its states are creating a huge demand for party financing while
shrinking the supply (traditionally met partly through kickbacks and other
illegal payments on public works contracts).
17  That, however, must be the
subject of another essay.
Minor cases of corruption, involving customs officials or other
inspectors, have on occasion been documented in relation to fraud against the
Community funds. It has not been possible yet to trace the connection between
what appear to be domestic cases of corruption and Community funds or
regulations. This is a subject of my research at the time of writing. It is not
possible to say whether national governments (and their party coalitions) and
other political parties are involved in EU fraud–if they were, it would amount
to corruption. But, returning to the discussion of the definition of corruption, it
may be enough that the member states have been negligent in pursuing
Community fraud, in allowing its growth–have they not permitted the
corrupting of the bases of the Community? As some would say, to the extent
that the member state governments have facilitated by neglect (deliberate or
benign) the degeneration of the Community’s founding ideals, they have
corrupted it (d’Aubert 1994; d’Aubert 1999).
Closing Remarks
In March of 1999, the entire European Commission, including its president,
was forced to resign under pressure from the European Parliament. A
“Committee of Independent Experts” (CIE), appointed by the Parliament, had
published a report exposing considerable mismanagement and possible fraud
within the Commission and its Directorates. The report also noted problems
with the administration and capabilities of UCLAF. While the Commissioners
were not all found to have personally engaged in fraudulent activity, they were
17Parties also have been financed through a variety of legal means, which have also been
diminishing. Yet illegally gained funds have clearly constituted a significant if not
specifiable portion of their resources.27
found to have “allowed, or even encouraged, conduct which, although not
illegal per se, was not acceptable” (CIE 1999, 9.3.1). Within the Commission’s
Directorates, however, fraud found an easy target: lax oversight, insufficient or
unqualified personnel, and programs which mandated rapid awarding of
contracts (e.g. CIE 1999, 6, 7.8). The “MED” program, to give aid to the
southern Mediterranean countries after the Gulf War, is but one example. As
the CIE report states, the program’s main goal was “to channel the cooperation
funds by means of subsidies to non-governmental organisations,” avoiding
member state government offices. The Commission contracted with a
consultancy to set up a network of private firms to administer the program. The
conditions under which the private firms were chosen were dubious, the
Commission’s response time when alerted to irregularities was very slow (CIE
1999, 3.1-3.4), and there were conflicts of interest between the Commission
and the private firms, and between the several private firms (CIE 1999, 3.5).
That the Commissioners’ escaped direct charges of fraud and corruption is
largely due to the CIE’s restrictive definition of fraud. If one adopted the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank’s definition, “the use of public
office for private gain” (Gray and Kaufmann 1998, 7; cf. Lancaster and
Montinola 1997, 188), then one might find more instances; for example, the
case of Edith Cresson, cited above, whose staff member appears to have
conducted work on behalf of Commissioner Cresson’s political career in
France, rather than carry out any EU responsibilities (CIE 1999, 8.1).
Allegedly in order to better “police” the Commission and its
bureaucracies, UCLAF was transformed into OLAF (Organisation de la Lutte
Anti-Fraude): a general anti-fraud office, with, nevertheless, restricted powers
of investigation, and no possibility of bringing prosecution (House of Lords
1999, Part I, 15). Its powers vis-à-vis the member states were not increased.
The changes made appear to be largely cosmetic, indicating the reluctance of
the member states, the so-called “principals,” to subject themselves and their
actions as agents administering EU programs, to any effective oversight.
This paper has raised the possibility that some types of fraud and
corruption are a deliberate strategy on the part of member state governments.
They and their key economic allies benefit from it, while the costs are borne by
a diffuse group which is incapable of unseating them. This hypothesis does not
help us decide whether all member state governments will do this, or merely
those with a tradition of using corruption or patronage in their own countries.
What little evidence I have found has produced mixed answers. It does seem
safe to say that where a member state government’s electoral interests are
threatened by EU fraud, the member state government is more likely to support
anti-fraud action.28
The Commission’s resignation in 1999 provided the states with a
convenient scapegoat for EU fraud: the Commission. The latter is indeed an
example of the problems and difficulties associated with the unique
institutional structure of the EU: in contrast to standard parliamentary
democracies, the Commission’s leadership is not responsible to a legislative
body. Commission membership is not derived from the European Parliament;
the European Parliament can only oust the entire Commission, and the member
states can only recall their own respective nationals. The Commission does
have to justify its expenditures and contracts to the Court of Auditors and
European Parliament, but despite a recent change in the relationship between
the new (Prodi) Commission and the Parliament (September 1999), it is likely
that many years will go by before the Commission is held wholly responsible
for its actions (CIE 1999).
Ironically, although the solution to fraud problems in the Commission
may lie in giving it (and the European Parliament) more powers, particularly
overlapping powers and an EU-level policing and customs agency (cf.
Andrews and Montinola 1998), the member states now have the excuse they
need to avoid doing so. Why give more power to a badly run institution?
Unfortunately, the Santer Commission’s failings have taken the focus away
from the areas where the most costly fraudulent activities take place: the
programs administered by the member states, including the preferential tariff
agreements (House of Lords 1999, Part I, 2).
There is, of course, no guarantee that by making the EU’s structure more
like a parliamentary system (federal or centralized), fraud and corruption will
be reduced. Italy, Greece and Belgium immediately come to mind as reasons
for pessimism. The European Parliament’s relative “innocence” may be a
function of its being relatively powerless, in comparison to the Commission
and the member states. If institutional position and opportunities are what fuel
fraud, then strengthening the Parliament could result in yet another locus for
activities the EU would like, in principle, to discourage.
In addition, Commission and Court of Auditor officials are reluctant to
rank member states according to how corrupt they perceive them to be, or to
say which states tend to have the most fraud. Occasionally an official would
note that a particular country, or region (“the northern states”) tended to
comply with a set of rules, but because being explicit about fraud in the
member states against the Community is perceived to be “too political,”
officials will not implicate particular states. They are also reluctant to name
specific cases.29
 This paper has outlined fundamental questions pertaining to
international organizations: can an institution like the EU, which both draws
and depends upon national preferences, personnel, and institutions, succeed in
constraining the various forms of fraud and corruption which have, at least at
times, characterized the practices of its members? Can an international
organization be structured so as to minimize the incentives and opportunities
for each member state, its economic actors and citizens, to exploit the
organization’s collective funds? If it was meant to solve a collective action
problem for national interest maximizing states, can it also not become a
victim of those interests? Answers to those questions will contribute to our
understanding of the sources of fraud and corruption; how culturally bound or
country-specific is corruption’s definition and practice? Is it mainly a question
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